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James D. Kirk appeals from a jury's guilty verdict of conduct a 
minor under sixteen and sexual battery of a minor sixteen or seventeen years 
age. Kirk argues that the prosecutor's singing of three lines from Dixie during 
closing argument was misconduct that amounted fundamental error requiring 
reversal. Kirk also asks the Court to amend the standard of review established 
in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (201 0), to shift the burden on 
appeal to the state to show that defendant's unobjected-to allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct did not affect the outcome of trial. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Kirk with felony lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen and felony sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of 
age. (R., pp. 11-12.) The two victims were then-17 year-old J.C. and then-13 
year-old M.F.; the two had run away from Syringa House, a group home for girls 
in Nampa, with then-15 year old A.M. and then-15 year-old M.G. (See 4/2/13 
Tr., p. 190, L. 25- p. 191, L. 21; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 14- p. 9, L. 7; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 
66, Ls. 6-16; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 110, Ls. 7-25.) The four girls saw Kirk outside his 
room at the Downtown Inn in Nampa, and J.C. approached him about a place for 
the four girls to stay for the night. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 194, Ls. 7-16; p. 197, Ls. 1-19.) 
He agreed. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 200, Ls. 7-9.) 
J.C. told Kirk she was 18. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 197, L. 14; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 17, L. 9; 
4/3/13 Tr., p. 72, L. 4; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 116, L. 16.) The other girls told Kirk that they 
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were 16 or 17 - under age, but older than their true ages, 13 to 15.1 Kirk turned 
on some music, and J.C. started dancing and taking off her clothes. 2 Kirk gave 
J C. a massage on the bed, then began touching and penetrating J.C 's vagina 
with his fingers and penis. 3 At some point, M.G. also laid down on the bed 
naked and Kirk began touching and penetrating M.G.'s vagina with his penis or 
fingers. 4 
The next morning, A.M. and M.G. left and got a ride to Boise. (4/2/13 Tr., 
p. 212, L. 25- p. 213, L. 2; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 25, L. 20- p. 26, L. 11; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 
81, Ls. 14-21.) J.C. and M.F. stayed in Kirk's room until that evening. (4/2/13 
Tr., p. 213, Ls. 5-11; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 247, Ls. 3-6; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 128, Ls. 3-9.) Later 
that night, after leaving Kirk's room, J.C. and M.F. were picked up in a park by 
police. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 213, L. 22- p. 214, L. 10; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 128, Ls. 5-24.) At 
first they gave police false names, then M.F. told the police their true names and 
what had happened in Kirk's hotel room the night before. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 214, L. 
1 A.M. told Kirk she was 17. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 9-10; p. 72, L. 5.) M.G. said 
she was 17. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 72, Ls. 4-5.) And M.F. said she was 16. (4/3/13 Tr., 
~· 116, Ls. 16-17.) 
This was corroborated by testimony from J.C. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 235, Ls. 16-17), 
A.M. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 16, L. 25 - p. 17, L. 2; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-13), M.G. 
~4/3/13 Tr., p. 73, Ls. 6-23), and M.F. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 119, L. 1). 
Manual to genital and genital to genital contact by Kirk on J.C. was 
'corroborated by testimony from J.C. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 204, Ls. 19-24; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 
206, L. 16- p. 207, L. 9; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 209, Ls. 1-21), A.M. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 
16-20; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 21, L. 12- p. 22, L. 17), M.G. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 76, L. 20 p. 
77, L. 2), and M.F. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 119, L. 13- p. 120, L. 14). 
4 Genital to genital contact between Kirk and M.F. is supported by testimony from 
J.C. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 209, L. 22- p. 210, L. 1; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 237, L. 21 - p. 238, L. 
3), M.G. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 77, Ls. 3-12), and M.F. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 123, Ls. 1-6). 
Manual to genital contact by Kirk on M.F. is supported by testimony from A.M. 
(4/3/13 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 23-24.) 
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17- 216, L. 2; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 129, L. 10- p. 130, L. 16.) told 
been raped. (4/3/13 Tr., p. 253, Ls. 3-11.) 
was interviewed and examined by a nurse. (4/3/13 
, p. 191, Ls. 2-3; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 198, Ls. 12-25; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 203, L. 24 - p. 
218, L. 15.) The nurse testified that M.F.'s perineum -the area between 
vagina and rectum -was "extremely red and tender," and the lower part of her 
vaginal opening had suffered "tearing and abrasion." (4/3/13 Tr., p. 214, Ls. 1-
22; 4/3/13 Tr., p. 217, L. 24 - p. 218, L. 9.) The nurse testified that M.F.'s 
injuries were consistent with M. having engaged in sexual intercourse. (4/3/13 
Tr., p. 220, Ls. 2-9.) J.C. was not cooperative with police and was not asked to 
undergo a sexual assault examination. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 77, L. 6- p. 78, L. 9.) 
At the police station, Kirk agreed to speak with police after being advised 
of his Miranda rights. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 49, L. 6 p. 50, L. 11.) The detective 
assigned to the case testified Kirk told him he "knew that they were runaways" 
and "thought they were under age," but that they "led him to believe that [J.C.] 
was 18." (4/4/13 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 6-9.) The detective further testified Kirk "kept 
making reference to statutory, and then he didn't want to talk himself into a case 
of statutory." (4/4/13 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 2-4.) 
After Kirk was charged with lewd conduct and sexual battery with minors 
J.C. and M.F., he pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 
11-12, 19-20, 37-38.) During voir dire, the trial court judge advised that 
prospective jurors could answer questions in writing or outside the presence of 
the rest of the panel if asked anything that would cause them embarrassment. 
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(4/2/13 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 16-20.) The trial court also informed the jury panel, "we 
want a jury that can decide this case fairly and impartially based only on the 
evidence presented here in court and the law that the court will give to you." 
(4/2/13 Tr., p. 36, L. 23 - p. 37, L. 1.) The trial court asked if there was any 
"reason ... why any one of you do not believe that you could be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case?" to which no juror responded. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 
1 0-14.) 
Towards the end of jury-selection, because Kirk is African-American, 
defense counsel brought up the topic of race, noting that "[t]here are a lot of 
people who believe we have moved past that, that race is no longer a factor." 
(4/2/13 Tr., p. 148, Ls. 9-11.) Counsel asked prospective jurors to "raise your 
hands if you believe that we as a society have moved past the fact that race is a 
factor in any kind of decision-making." (4/2/13 Tr., p. 148, Ls. 21-23.) Three of 
the jurors who raised their hands were ultimately seated on Kirk's jury. (4/2/13 
Tr., p. 149, Ls. 5-10; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 153, Ls. 5-9.) Counsel also asked jurors to 
raise their hands if they believed "race still can be considered a factor in society." 
(4/2/13 Tr., p. 149, Ls. 14-15.) The other nine jurors who were seated on the 
panel were among those who raised their hands after this query. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 
149, L. 21- p. 150, L. 8; 4/2/13 Tr., p. 153, Ls. 1-10.) 
The jury heard testimony from the victims J.C. and M.F., the other two 
girls in Kirk's room that night (A.M. and M.G.), the police officer and the detective 
assigned to the case, and the sexual assault nurse who examined M.F. (See 
generally, 4/2/13 Tr.; 4/3/13 Tr.; 4/4/13 Tr.) The state also admitted a redacted 
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video of the detective's interview with Kirk, which was played to the jury, (4/4/13 
Tr,, p, 53, L. 12- p. 54, L 23,) 
closing arguments, the prosecutor began her rebuttal: 
Ladies and gentlemen, when I was a kid we used to like to sings 
[sic] songs a lot. I always think of this one song. Some people 
know it. It's the Dixie song. Right? Oh, I wish I was in the land of 
cotton, Good times not forgotten. Look away. Look away. Look 
away, 
(4/4/13 Tr., p. 187, L. 25- p. 188, L. 5.) Connecting her introduction to the case, 
she continued, 
And isn't that really what you've kind of been asked to do? Look 
away from the two eyewitnesss [sic]. Look away from the two 
victims, Look away from the nurse in her medical opinion. Look 
away. Look away. Look away. 
(4/4/13 Tr., p. 188, Ls. 5-9.) The prosecutor then argued that inconsistencies in 
the witnesses' testimonies gave them credibility by revealing different 
perspectives of the same event. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 188, L. 14 - p. 189, L. 5.) 
Although defense counsel objected to other parts of the prosecutor's closing 
arguments, he did not object to the prosecutor's recital5 of Dixie. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 
161, Ls. 6-7; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 187, L. 25- p. 188, L. 13; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 192, Ls. 6-8.) 
The jury found Kirk guilty of both counts against him, and he was 
sentenced to a unified term of 20 years with eight years fixed on each count, to 
run concurrently. (R., pp. 194-95, 211-12.) Kirk timely appealed. (R., pp. 217-
22.) 
5 Although Kirk indicates the prosecutor sang the lines from Dixie (Appellant's 
brief, p. 1 ), the trial transcript does not reflect whether the prosecutor sang or 
only spoke the lines (4/4/13 Tr., p. 188, Ls. 1-9). 
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ISSUES 
Kirk states the issue on appeal as: 
Were Mr. Kirk's constitutional rights to due process, equal 
protection, and a fair trial violated by the State's unobjected-to 
misconduct in singing the Confederate anthem Dixie during closing 
arguments when Mr. Kirk, a black man, was on trial for alleged sex 
crimes against two female victims who appeared to be white? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Kirk failed to establish structural or fundamental error as to his 
unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
2. Has Kirk failed to show that the long-standing standard of review set forth 
in State v. Perry should be altered such that the state must show the 
defendant's unobjected-to allegation of prosecutorial misconduct did not 
affect the outcome of trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Kirk argues the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of 
structural or fundamental error when she sang three lines of phrase from the 
song Dixie. The prosecutor began her rebuttal closing, saying she enjoyed 
singing as a kid, and "always think[s] of this one song," then sang, "Oh, I wish I 
was in the land of cotton. Good times not forgotten. Look away. Look away. 
Look away." (4/4/13 Tr., p. 187, L. 25- p. 188, L. 5.) Then, giving context, she 
argued that defense counsel was asking the jury to look away from the 
testimonies of the state's witnesses. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 188, Ls. 5-9.) Kirk did not 
object. Kirk now argues for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor's singing 
was prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely object at trial to allegedly 
improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside for 
prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged 
misconduct rises to the level of structural or fundamental error. State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 222-23, 228, 245 P.3d 961,974-75, 980 (2010). 
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C. The Record And Law Do Not Support That The Prosecutor's Singing In 
The Introduction Of Her Rebuttal Closing Was Structural Error 
The Court in Perry recognized the following errors, found by the U S. 
Supreme Court to constitute structural defects: 
(1) complete denial of counsel ... ; (2) biased trial judge ... ; (3) 
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury ... ; (4) denial 
of self-representation at trial ... ; (5) denial of a public trial ... ; (6) 
defective reasonable-doubt instruction . . . ; and (7) erroneous 
deprivation of the right to counsel of choice. 
kL at 222, 245 P.3d at 974 (internal citations omitted). In each instance, the 
error is clear on its face. The Court continued, "[a]lthough there may be other 
constitutional violations that would so affect the core of the trial process that they 
require an automatic reversal, as a general rule, most constitutional violations will 
be subject to harmless error analysis." kL at 222-23, 245 P.3d at 974-75. 
The alleged error in this case is not on this list nor comparable to those 
identified as structural defects in Perry. Nor has Kirk even attempted to 
demonstrate how the alleged prosecutorial misconduct here rises to the level of 
the errors listed in Perry or that it "so affect[ed] the core of the trial process [as 
to] require an automatic reversal." kL As discussed further herein, the record 
does not support fundamental error, let alone structural error in this case. 
Instead, the disputed conduct by the prosecutor was simply an introduction to the 
prosecutor's rebuttal closing, unrelated to Kirk's race, and that did not impact the 
outcome of Kirk's trial. Accordingly, this Court should reject Kirk's argument that 
the alleged misconduct amounted to structural error. 
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Kirk Has Not Demonstrated Fundamental Error Because He Has Failed 
To Articulate How The Prosecutor's Partial-Recitation Of Dixie In The 
Introduction Of Her Rebuttal Closing Violated His Right To A Fair Trial 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 
(Ct. App. 201 0). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to 
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to a fair trial in a fair tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. To 
establish fundamental error, a defendant has the burden of demonstrating (1) 
violation of one or more unwaived constitutional rights; (2) that the constitutional 
error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional 
information" including information "as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision;" and (3) "that the error affected the defendant's substantial 
rights," generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings." kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
1. Kirk Fails To Demonstrate A Violation Of A Constitutional Right 
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). But appeals to the emotion, passion, or prejudice 
of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007). Nor may a 
prosecutor "attempt[ J to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set 
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forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence," as doing so, 
"impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 
Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. "[A] prosecutor is constitutionally prohibited from 
making racially or ethnically inflammatory remarks during its closing argument." 
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003)(citing 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n. 30 (1 987)(other citation omitted)). 
"Such comments violate a criminal defendant's due process and equal protection 
rights." kL (citing Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
The record here does not support that the prosecutor quoted from Dixie to 
appeal to the jury's emotion, passion or prejudice, or to secure a verdict on a 
factor other than the law or evidence. Nor does the record support that the 
prosecutor's recitation from Dixie was a racially inflammatory remark. Rather, 
the record demonstrates that the prosecutor used a few lines from Dixie to 
introduce her summary of the defense's argument: that the jury should "look 
away" from the state's witnesses' testimony. (4/4/13 Tr., p. 187, L. 25- p. 188, 
L. 9.) 
Kirk asserts that the prosecutor's alleged misconduct "served to inject 
race into a case in which a black man was charged with sex crimes against two 
female victims, both of whom appeared to be white." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) As 
shown by the extensive evidence cited in Kirk's appellate brief, Dixie has 
historical ties with the pro-Confederacy, pro-slave movement. (Appellant's brief, 
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pp. 2, 7 -9. 6) But the record in case, the lines from and 
use in prosecutor's closing, does not evidence of Dixie's 
history. The record does any prosecutor 
racial animus. 
Kirk's argument he was denied a fair trial implies that the jury was 
influenced to deliver a verdict based not only on race, but on racism, rather than 
on the evidence. In other words, Kirk implies that the jury not only understood 
that quoting lines from Dixie was a call to consider race, but that the jury heeded 
that call. This argument assumes the jury was racially prejudiced. But Kirk fails 
to identify anything in the record supporting that the jury's verdict was influenced 
in this way. 
Notably, defense counsel broached the topic of race in voir dire, 
suggesting that some people believe that the nation has moved beyond race. 
(4/2/13 Tr., p. 148, Ls. 9-11.) Counsel asked prospective jurors if anyone agreed 
"that we as a society have moved past the fact that race is a factor in any kind of 
decision-making." ( 4/2/13 , p. 148, Ls. 21-23.) Three jurors who were 
ultimately seated on Kirk's jury raised their hands. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 149, Ls. 5-10; 
4/2/13 Tr., p. 153, Ls. 5-9.) Counsel also asked if anyone believed "race still can 
be considered a factor in society." (4/2/13 Tr., p. 149, Ls. 14-15.) The other nine 
jurors on Kirk's jury raised their hands. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 149, L. 21 - p. 150, L. 8; 
6 The State's objection to this attempt to add evidence to the appellate record 
appears below. 
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4/2/13 Tr., p. 153, Ls. 1-10.) None of the prospective jurors indicated that they 
would be biased in rendering a verdict if selected to serve. (4/2/13 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 
10-14.) The record is devoid of any indication the jury rendered its decision 
based on race or racism - whether because of the prosecutor's reference to 
Dixie or not. Accordingly, Kirk has failed to show he was denied a fair trial, and 
has failed to meet his burden of establishing the first prong of Perry, violation of 
an unwaived constitutional right. 
2. Kirk Has Failed To Show That A Constitutional Violation Is Clear 
From The Record, And Instead Demonstrates The Opposite By 
Attempting To Introduce Extensive Evidence From Outside The 
Record To Support His Argument 
Kirk's appellate brief highlights his inability to satisfy the second prong 
under Perry, that a constitutional violation is clear or obvious from the record. 
Kirk devotes more than three pages to discussing the historically pro-slavery 
significance of the song Dixie. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 7-9.) Kirk cites a 1904 
writing by Charles Burleigh Galbreath, the Kentucky Post, the Washington 
Times, the Commercial Appeal, the Washington Post, the Oxford English 
Reference Dictionary, and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. (Appellant's brief, pp. 2, 
7-9.) These materials are offered as evidence that parts of society now frown 
upon the song's casual use. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) But this evidence 
is not part of the record in this case and must be disregarded. State v. Johnson, 
148 Idaho 664, 670, 227 P.3d 918, 924 (2010); State v. Perez-Jungo, _ P.3d 
_, 2014 WL 2053873 at 1, n. 1 (Ct. App. 2014). Kirk's burden is to show error 
that is clear on the record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The 
record here offers no connection between Dixie and an issue of race or slavery. 
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After the prosecutor's set-up that she singing as a 
sang the lines, "Oh, I wish I was in the land of . Good times not forgotten. 
Look away. Look away. Look away;" she explained, "isn't that really 
you've kind of been asked to do?" (4/4/13 Tr., p. 187, L. 25 - p. 188, L. 9.) 
Without the evidence introduced in Kirk's appellate brief, the prosecutor's alleged 
misconduct was simply a personal story of singing in her youth, arriving at her 
argument that Kirk wanted the jurors to ignore the states' witnesses' testimony. 
Nothing in the record indicates that either the prosecutor or Kirk's jury was aware 
of the song's pro-slavery roots or would have interpreted the argument as 
injecting race into the trial. And to the extent any members of the jury were 
aware of the song's infamy, the record does not support that their awareness 
would have led them to convict Kirk upon hearing three lines from the song. As 
already discussed, the record from voir dire supports the opposite conclusion. 
Accordingly, Kirk has failed to establish either the first or second prongs from 
Perry. 
3. Kirk Has Failed To Show Error Affecting The Outcome Of Trial 
Finally, Kirk has not established the third prong from Perry, that the 
alleged error affected the outcome of his trial. Kirk cites a number of non-binding 
cases discussing the perils of virulent prejudice provoked by prosecutors' 
arguments appealing to "race prejudice in the context of a sexual crime." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-14.) Already limited to their persuasive value, those 
cases are easily distinguishabfe on their facts. 
13 
In State v. Rogan, the defendant, an African-American, was convicted of 
four counts of sexual assault. 984 P.2d 1231 (Haw. 1999). During rebuttal 
argument, the prosecutor said: "This is every mother's nightmare. Leave your 
daughter for an hour and a half, and you walk back in, and here's some black, 
military guy on top of your daughter." lsi at 1238. Defense counsel interjected, 
"Objection, your Honor. This is an appeal to racism." lsi Despite "defense 
counsel's timely objection," the trial court overruled and gave no curative 
instruction. lsi at 1241. The Court reversed on appeal. lsi at 1250. Unlike the 
opening lines from Dixie, the prosecutor's objected-to statements in Rogan 
directly concerned the case before the jury, addressed the defendant's race, and 
appealed to the jury's emotion by suggesting the scenario was "every mother's 
nightmare." Given the factual and procedural dissimilarities with Kirk's case, the 
appellate court's decision in Rogan offers no meaningful guidance. 
In State v. Guthrie, the defendant, who was Caucasian, was convicted of 
first-degree murder. 461 S.E.2d 163 (W.Va. 1995). The prosecutor cross-
examined the defendant's father about defendant's prejudices, before a jury that 
included a number of women, and one African-American. lsi at 185-87. The 
prosecutor asked if defendant told the witness that men are better than women, 
and whites are better than blacks, or if he ever discussed the Ku Klux Klan. lsi 
The Court noted that "[t]he primary issue in this case was not one of guilt or 
innocence, but the degree of homicide for which the defendant would ultimately 
be convicted." lsi at 191. The Court determined it was error to permit the 
prosecution to "influence the jury's evaluation and decision" by suggesting 
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defendant "was a racist, a a Nazi, and a KKK sympathizer." 
Ultimately, the Court's decision was based on its finding there were a number of 
errors warranting reversal, in contrast to the one assertion error here. at 
192. Moreover, the prosecutor's singing did not improperly appeal to emotion, 
but simply suggested that Kirk's argument was to "look away" from the evidence. 
As with Rogan, Guthrie is not useful here. 
In State v. Cabrera, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, 
second-degree intentional murder, and four counts of attempted first-degree 
murder. 700 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 2005). The defendant argued the prosecution 
committed misconduct by stating in rebuttal closing argument that defense 
counsel engaged in "wild and, I submit, racist speculation" that because the 
state's witnesses "happen to be black ... [and] have been in gangs in the past 
... that they are people to be feared." ~at 474. The state countered that "the 
defense injected the issue of gangs, and by implication race, into the trial." ~ 
The court on appeal disagreed. ~ Although the defense raised the possibility 
that gang rivalry played a role in the shooting at issue in the case, it "never 
mentioned the race of a witness or even implied that race was a factor." ~ 
Accordingly, the prosecution's rebuttal was misconduct warranting remand for a 
new trial. ~ at 475. The prosecution's singing in this case is more akin to the 
defense's arguments in Cabrera - absent mention of race or implication that 
race was a factor. If anything, Cabrera supports that the prosecution here did 
not inject race into Kirk's case. 
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In McFarland v. Smith, the appellant petitioned for habeas relief, arguing 
his constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor argued in closing, "the 
fact is that Officer Dorman is black and the Defendant is black .... That's a fact 
like you consider any other fact. If she's lying she's lying against a member, a 
person that is black." 611 F.2d 414, 416 (2nd Cir. 1979). The prosecutor "thus 
urged the jury to credit Officer Dorman's testimony on the theory that the 
probability of truthfulness was increased by the circumstance that a Black person 
was testifying against another Black person." lsi. The Court held "[w]hen a 
prosecutor's summation includes racial remarks in an effort to persuade a jury to 
return a guilty verdict, the resulting conviction is constitutionally unfair unless the 
remarks are abundantly justified." ld. 416-17. McFarland is also 
distinguishable. The singing of lines from Dixie -that do not mention race -to 
set up the argument that the jury should not "look away" from the evidence is not 
an effort to persuade the jury to return a guilty verdict based on race. 
In United States v. Grey, the defendant was found guilty of bank robbery. 
422 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1970). While cross-examining a character witness for 
Grey, the prosecutor asked if the witness knew "that Grey, a Negro, and a 
married man, was 'running around with a white go-go dancer."' lsi. at 1046. The 
Court found "no nonprejudicial explanation for the 'white go-go dancer' question 
asked by the United States Attorney." lsi. at 1045. "At best, the entire question 
was a magnificent irrelevance ... At worst, the gratuitous reference to the race 
of the go-go dancer may be read as a deliberate attempt to employ racial 
prejudice to strengthen the hand of the United States government." lsi. Applying 
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Grey here, there is a nonprejudicial explanation the singing of Dixie- a set-up 
for the phrase "look away." Also, the prosecution did not reference race; thus, 
there is no evidence it was prejud to Kirk. 
In Miller v. North Carolina, the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
rape and petitioned for federal habeas relief. 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978). The 
defendant argued prosecutorial misconduct violating his constitutional rights 
when the prosecutor said in closing, "I argue to you that the average white 
woman abhors anything of this type in nature that had to do with a black man. It 
is innate within us." lsi. at 704. The Fourth Circuit held, "Where the jury is 
exposed to highly prejudicial argument by the prosecutor's calculated resort to 
racial prejudice on an issue as sensitive as consent to sexual intercourse in a 
prosecution for rape, we think that the prejudice engendered is so great that 
automatic reversal is required." lsi. at 708. Kirk's allegation of error here does 
not compare to the structural error of the prosecution's argument in Miller that no 
white woman would have consensual sex with a black man. The lines from Dixie 
did not mention race, were not an argument involving race, and merely 
introduced the theme of "looking away" from the evidence. They were not 
harmful to Kirk. 
In addition to those non-binding cases, Kirk cited the footnote from one 
U.S. Supreme Court case for the general proposition that "prosecutorial 
discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of race." McKieskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 310 n. 30 (1987)(cited at Appellant's brief, p. 1 0.) This well-
established legal tenet does not apply here because the record fails to support 
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that the prosecutor exercised her discretion here based on race. In sum, Kirk 
fails to cite any binding or persuasive legal authority that, applied to this case, 
warrants reversal. 
Moreover, the great weight of evidence presented by the state supports 
that the prosecutor's quoting of the song did not contribute to Kirk's guilty verdict 
The jury heard from the two victims, two other eyewitnesses to the crimes, the 
assigned detective and police officer, and a forensic nurse who examined the 
younger victim. (See generally Tr.; Statement Of Facts, supra.) Although details 
of the night in question differed, the testimony from all witnesses was consistent 
as to the elements of the charged crimes: MF was under 16 years of age, and 
JC was 16 or 17 (4/4/13 Tr., p. 146, L. 15; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 147, L. 18; 4/4/13 Tr. ,p. 
148, Ls. 5-6); the crimes happened on August 13, 2012, in Idaho (4/4/13 Tr., p. 
146, Ls. 9-10; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 20-21); Kirk committed "genital to genital 
contact and/or [an act ot] oral to genital contact and/or an act of manual to 
genital contact on the victims" (4/4/13 Tr., p. 146, Ls. 11-14; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 147, 
Ls. 22-25); and Kirk did so "with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify 
the lusts, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant, of such child, or of some 
other person" (4/4/13 Tr., p. 146, Ls. 17-20; 4/4/13 Tr., p. 148, Ls. 1-4). 
Given the evidence at trial, Kirk has not demonstrated that the 
prosecutor's singing injected racial animus into the trial. There is nothing in the 
record suggesting that the prosecutor's singing or her choice of song contributed 
to the jury's verdict. Accordingly, Kirk has failed to meet his burden of showing 
the alleged error affected the outcome of his trial. 
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II. 
Kirk Has Failed To Show The Court Should Reject The Well-Established 
Standard Of Review In Perry And Adopt A New Standard Shifting The Burden 
On Appeal From The Defendant To The State 
Kirk suggests that his burden of demonstrating that the alleged error 
affected the outcome of his case - as set forth in Perry- should be shifted to the 
state, to show harmless error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-19.) The burden on 
appeal of showing whether the alleged error has impacted a substantial right is 
rooted in Rule 52. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977. As explained by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, "When the defendant has made a timely objection to an 
error, ... Rule 52(a) applies," and "precludes error correction only if the error 
'does not affect substantial rights."' kL (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 734-35 (1993)). When the defendant has forfeited the error, "Rule 52(b) 
authorizes no remedy unless the error does "affect[t] substantial rights."' kL 
There is a "strong societal interest in finality of judgments." Perry, 150 
Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977 (citing Puckett v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009).) 
The courts recognize that the trial court is "best suited to deal with potential error 
at trial, before a verdict has been reached," thus defendants should be 
encouraged to properly object at trial. kL Nonetheless, defendants may still 
appeal, as here, even where a timely objection was not raised, in the interest of 
fundamental justice. kL In such circumstance, "It is the defendant rather than 
the government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." 
kL (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35). 
Kirk urges this Court to reject the standard of review from Perry and 
require the state to show harmless error even where a defendant alleges, for the 
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first time on appeal, that the prosecution has injected race into a criminal trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-19.) Kirk's proposed amended standard would 
discourage timely objections and result in more prosecutorial misconduct issues 
being addressed solely on appeal rather than at trial where the issue could be 
best resolved. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977. 
Kirk cites a 2000 survey, again outside of the record in this case and thus 
not properly considered, that racial minorities do not believe the criminal justice 
system is colorblind. (Appellant's brief, p. 15.) Even if the survey were 
appropriately before this Court, shifting defendant's burden on appeal to the 
state does not address the concern raised therein. Kirk has not articulated why 
or how it does so. Kirk asserts that prosecutorial misconduct "fundamentally 
undermines the principle of equal justice and is ... repugnant to the concept of 
an impartial trial." (Appellant's brief, p. 15 (quoting State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 
551, 558 (Wash. 2011 )).) However, an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is 
just that - an allegation. Kirk has not identified how it would be fundamentally 
more fair to shift the burden of showing harmless error to the state where a 
defendant failed to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. Absent a 
valid legal basis to overturn well-established law on the standard of review for 
unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, this Court should reject Kirk's argument 
to do so. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respectfully requests that this affirm judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 9th day of June, 2014. 
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